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REEVALUATING 
THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT:  
AMENDING THE STATUTE TO EXPLICITLY 
ADDRESS THE CLOUD 
Amanda B. Gottlieb* 
 
Cloud-computing systems from companies such as Apple, Google, and 
Microsoft can run on multiple types of devices, such as laptops, tablets, and 
smartphones, and can sync data across these devices.  Many consumers 
initially invest in several of these products, then later choose to upgrade and 
purchase the newest models, resulting in the same cloud-computing accounts 
syncing to a variety of gadgets. 
This Note seeks to answer the question whether an individual violates the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), an antihacking statute passed by 
Congress in 1986, when she accesses data that is on a device only because it 
is stored in the cloud, after receiving authorization to use the device for other 
purposes like internet browsing.  To do so, this Note first traces the CFAA’s 
history and explores the four approaches to interpreting authorization under 
the Act adopted by different courts of appeals.  Next, this Note argues that 
although the CFAA is widely interpreted in the employment context, courts 
can still analyze an individual’s access to data on a cloud-computing system 
through the CFAA lens as the Act is currently written.  This Note then applies 
each CFAA approach to a scenario involving the cloud. 
Under the current interpretations of authorization, instances where an 
individual harmlessly accesses the cloud data of another user could be 
classified as hacking and a violation of this federal statute.  As such, this Note 
demonstrates that all of the current interpretations of the CFAA are too 
broad because they could result in this nonsensical outcome.  This Note 
accordingly proposes an amendment to the CFAA specifically addressing 
user access to data on the cloud.  Such an amendment would eliminate the 
unusual result of innocuous cloud-computing users being deemed hackers 
under federal law. 
 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2018, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2012, University of 
Michigan.  I would like to thank Professor Joel Reidenberg and the editors and staff of the 
Fordham Law Review for their assistance and guidance in publishing my Note.  I would also 
like to thank Matt and my family for their endless love and support.  Without their 
encouragement, none of this would be possible. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On July 1, 2016, Edward Majerczyk was charged with felony computer 
hacking related to a phishing scheme that gave him illegal access to over 300 
iCloud and Gmail accounts, including some belonging to celebrities.1  The 
 
 1. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., Illinois Man 
Charged with Hacking Apple iCloud and Gmail Accounts Belonging to More Than 300 
People, Including Many Celebrities (July 1, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/ 
illinois-man-charged-hacking-apple-icloud-and-gmail-accounts-belonging-more-300-people 
[https://perma.cc/KS7Z-DE73].  
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charges against Majerczyk stemmed from an investigation by the FBI into 
leaked pictures of female celebrities.2  His scheme involved sending emails 
to victims that appeared to be from security accounts of internet service 
providers.3  The victims were directed to a website where they were prompted 
with a fraudulent login screen, which collected their usernames and 
passwords.4  Majerczyk ultimately pleaded guilty to a felony violation of the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).5 
Majerczyk’s story is a prototypical example of a person actively trying to 
steal information from others—an act typically thought of as hacking in 
violation of the CFAA.6  Imagine instead that a friend, significant other, or 
coworker innocently asks to borrow your tablet to have internet access for a 
few days as a substitute for her computer, which is being repaired.  You may 
not think twice about letting her borrow your device.  Today’s technology, 
however, presents a unique problem that you might easily overlook:  because 
many commonly used devices can be synced through a cloud-computing 
system (“the cloud”),7 whomever you lent your device to now has continuous 
access to your email, messages, photos, calendar, and other personal 
information that may be stored in the cloud.8  For example, loaning someone 
your iPad may be indistinguishable from loaning them your iPhone because 
any data stored on the cloud may be accessible through both devices.9  Any 
actions taken on your smartphone could automatically sync to the tablet you 
lent out, due to real-time updates of your data on the cloud.10 
In the hypothetical situation above, though you gave this person access to 
your device to browse the internet, you likely did not intend to give her access 
to your entire cloud account as well.  As technology continues to advance 
and people upgrade to the latest electronics, it is not hard to imagine other 
situations in which your unlocked device, connected to the cloud, falls into 
the hands of someone else.  For instance, this issue could arise if an individual 
decides to sell a phone on eBay (or another similar site) or donate it to a 
charity to be repurposed without thoroughly restoring the device to factory 
settings.  The operative question thus becomes, is the inadvertent access of 
 
 2. Id.  
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).  The CFAA was passed by Congress in 
1986 as an antihacking statute and has been amended over the years to encompass many types 
of computer crimes. See infra Part I.B.  When referring to § 1030 of the CFAA, this Note is 
referencing the portion of the U.S. Code where the Act is codified unless otherwise indicated. 
 6. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030; see also infra Part I.B (providing an overview of the CFAA).  
Majerczyk is classified as an outside hacker as opposed to an inside hacker. See infra notes 
76–83 and accompanying text (explaining inside and outside hackers).  When an individual 
violates the CFAA, she has acted “without authorization” or “exceeds authorized access” 
under the statute. See infra Part I.B (discussing these terms, which are found within the text of 
the CFAA).   
 7. See infra Part I.A (explaining the function and purpose of these systems).  The terms 
“cloud-computing system” and “the cloud” will be used interchangeably throughout this Note. 
 8. This hypothetical situation is referenced throughout this Note.  
 9. See infra Part I.A (explaining the function and purpose of cloud-computing systems).  
 10. See infra Part I.A (discussing how the cloud seamlessly syncs devices with one 
another). 
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your personal information by a third party through the cloud, when given 
general access to your device, a violation of the CFAA?11 
Despite no mention of a traditional computer in the hypothetical situation, 
the CFAA is still the applicable statute.  Under the CFAA definition of 
“computer,”12 the list of items that qualify as computers is expansive and 
continuously growing as technology advances.  The definition currently 
includes any device with a microchip, such as smartphones, tablets, and 
laptops.13  However, while courts have recognized that newly developed 
devices may fall within the CFAA’s purview,14 the law in practice has not 
been able to keep up with new innovations, and the cloud currently exists in 
a sort of legal purgatory.15  Although courts would likely determine that the 
cloud falls within the ambit of the CFAA,16 courts face the difficult challenge 
of determining how the CFAA in practice would apply to situations involving 
unauthorized access to data on a cloud system.17 
Congress passed the CFAA in 1986 to address the growing problem of 
computer crimes but, despite the numerous amendments to the Act, none 
reflect the unique problems posed by the cloud.18  Further complicating the 
statute’s application to this present-day issue, the CFAA has been interpreted 
mostly in the employment context and there is a circuit split regarding how 
 
 11. Cloud-computing systems could include Apple’s iCloud, Google’s Google Drive, or 
Microsoft’s OneDrive.  Data on cloud-computing systems have been analyzed in terms of the 
Fourth Amendment and the government’s access to information stored in the cloud. See, e.g., 
William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?:  Cloud Computing Privacy Under the 
Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1211 (2010) (analyzing government access to 
the cloud under the Fourth Amendment).  This Note takes a different approach by analyzing 
access to information on the cloud through the CFAA.  Lawsuits involving the cloud are likely 
to become more common as individuals increasingly rely on cloud-computing systems to store 
their data. See id. at 1204; see also infra Part I.A.  The question this Note seeks to resolve is 
important because the cloud is not specifically mentioned in the text of the CFAA.  Computer 
access under this statute is an ambiguous area of the law, which should be clarified before an 
innocuous computer user is unfairly classified as a hacker for accessing another person’s cloud 
data. See infra Part III.  
 12. The CFAA defines “computer” as “an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, 
or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, 
and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or 
operating in conjunction with such device.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1) (2012).   
 13. Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. 
L. REV. 1561, 1577–78 (2010); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1); United States v. Kramer, 631 
F.3d 900, 901 (8th Cir. 2011) (affirming an expansive definition of “computer” and holding 
that an ordinary cell phone was a computer under the definition found in the CFAA).  In fact, 
Steve Wozniak, cofounder of Apple, has said that “[e]verything has a computer in it 
nowadays.” Mark Milian, Apple’s Steve Wozniak:  We’ve Lost a Lot of Control, CNN (Dec. 
8, 2010, 12:16 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/innovation/12/08/steve.wozniak. 
computers/index.html [https://perma.cc/DU35-HNDN]. 
 14. See Kramer, 631 F.3d at 903–04. 
 15. See infra Part III.  
 16. Christopher Satti, A Call to (Cyber) Arms:  Applicable Statutes and Suggested Courses 
of Action for the Celebrity iCloud Hacking Scandal, 34 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 561, 582 (2016).  
 17. See Jay P. Kesan et al., Information Privacy and Data Control in Cloud Computing:  
Consumers, Privacy Preferences, and Market Efficiency, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 341, 371 
(2013).  
 18. See infra Part I.B.  The cloud is unique because it can seamlessly sync many devices 
with one other and quickly pass information between devices. See infra Part I.A. 
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the words “exceeds authorized access,” included in § 1030(a)(2) of the Act, 
are interpreted.19 
This Note argues that all of the current interpretations of authorization 
under the CFAA adopted by the circuit courts to determine whether a 
computer user is a hacker are inadequate when applied to situations involving 
the cloud, like the hypothetical outlined above.20  This Note ultimately 
proposes an amendment to the CFAA to specifically address the cloud.  Part 
I of this Note discusses the background of cloud computing and the CFAA.  
Part II then analyzes the circuit split that currently exists in this area of the 
law and then applies the different approaches to the hypothetical involving 
the cloud outlined at the beginning of this Note.21  Part III concludes that the 
interpretations of authorization that evolved from the circuit courts in the 
employment context can be applied to this new situation but that all of them 
would classify an innocuous cloud-computing user as a hacker, which is an 
inequitable result.  Part III also suggests an amendment to the CFAA to 
specifically address cloud computing because, as a matter of common sense, 
an individual in this hypothetical situation should not be considered a hacker. 
I.  AN OVERVIEW:  UNDERSTANDING THE CLOUD 
AND THE CFAA BEFORE THEY INTERSECT 
Tracing the intersection of the cloud and the CFAA necessitates a brief 
overview of their historical origins and functional mechanisms.  Part I.A 
discusses the definition of cloud computing and analyzes the function and 
purpose of cloud-computing systems.  Part I.B then examines the evolution 
of the CFAA into the expansive criminal statute that it is today. 
A.  Cloud Computing:  Definition, Function, and Purpose 
Although there is no single definition of “cloud computing,” many scholars 
cite the definition established by the National Institute for Standards and 
Technology (NIST).22  According to the NIST, “cloud computing is a model 
 
 19. Much of the case law surrounding the CFAA revolves around issues in the 
employment context.  Usually an employer brings charges against a former employee for 
“exceed[ing] authorized access” when utilizing the company computer system. See infra Part 
II (explaining the various interpretations of the CFAA adopted by the circuit courts).  
 20. The scenario where someone comes into contact with another person’s personal 
information through a cloud-computing system may touch upon a variety of areas that the law 
protects in addition to hacking, such as interception and privacy.  This Note looks at whether 
the action is considered hacking and focuses solely on whether an individual has violated the 
CFAA.  In the interest of concision, this Note does not address applications of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) to the operative hypothetical.  Due to the expansive 
reach of the CFAA, it controls almost every interaction with a computer and is the “primary 
federal authority protecting computing technology from intrusions.” Jonathan S. Keim, 
Updating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, ENGAGE, Oct. 2015, at 31, 32; see also infra 
Parts I.B, II.  In addition, the statute that later became the CFAA was the first federal statute 
to criminalize unauthorized access to computers. See infra notes 48–49 and accompanying 
text.  
 21. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  
 22. See William R. Denny, Survey of Recent Developments in the Law of Cloud 
Computing and Software as a Service Agreement, 66 BUS. LAW. 237, 237 & n.1 (2010); Kesan 
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for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared 
pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, 
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with 
minimal management effort or service provider interaction.”23  Cloud 
computing has also been described as “a multi-faceted technological 
phenomenon in which important aspects of computing . . . move from local 
systems to more efficient, outsourced systems where third parties provide 
aggregated computational resources and services on an as-needed basis from 
remote locations.”24 
Much of society’s daily digital consumption occurs through the cloud.25  
Today, people often communicate through social networking sites and 
electronic messaging, such as email, text messaging, and other instant 
messaging applications that use the internet.26  Smartphones now allow users 
to access email, calendars, websites, documents, and PDFs on the go.27  The 
cloud also enables users to run applications and store data over the internet 
instead of on a specific computer, which makes a personal computer’s hard 
drive unnecessary for saving information.28  So long as a user has a device 
connected to the cloud, the information can be accessed from anywhere on a 
variety of devices over the internet.29 
Cloud-computing service providers “operate a group of computer servers 
that are connected to each other and function as a single ‘cloud’ of 
resources.”30  Cloud computing offers consumers flexibility and access to 
cloud storage for their information without a large financial investment.31  
Cloud providers are able to keep costs down because customers are often 
sharing a “pool of computing resources.”32  The customer is usually unaware 
of exactly where her data is being stored or what the service infrastructure 
looks like.33 
 
et al., supra note 17, at 356.  The NIST has statutory responsibilities under the Federal 
Information Security Management Act of 2002 and is responsible for developing standards 
and guidelines for providing adequate information security for all agency operations and 
assets. See PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T 
OF COMMERCE, SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-145, THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD 
COMPUTING § 1.1 (2011). 
 23. MELL & GRANCE, supra note 22, § 2. 
 24. Urs Gasser, Cloud Innovation and the Law:  Issues, Approaches, and Interplay 2 
(Berkman Ctr. for Internet & Soc’y at Harvard Univ., Research Publication No. 2014-7, 2014), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2410271 [https://perma.cc/GP6E-SVLC]. 
 25. See Kesan et al., supra note 17, at 341.  
 26. See id. at 350.  
 27. See id. at 351. 
 28. See Robison, supra note 11, at 1199–1200.  
 29. See id. at 1202; see also Simon Bradshaw et al., Contracts for Clouds:  Comparison 
and Analysis of the Terms and Conditions of Cloud Computing Services 5 (Sch. of Law at 
Queen Mary Univ. of London, Research Paper No. 63/2010, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1662374 [https://perma.cc/UC47-53BM]. 
 30. Robison, supra note 11, at 1199. 
 31. See Bradshaw et al., supra note 29, at 1. 
 32. Id. at 5. 
 33. See id. at 3. 
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On June 6, 2011, Apple introduced the world to its version of the cloud, 
iCloud, for the first time.34  In a press release, Apple described iCloud as “a 
breakthrough set of free new cloud services that work seamlessly with 
applications on your iPhone, iPad, iPod touch, Mac, or PC to automatically 
and wirelessly store your content in iCloud and automatically and wirelessly 
push it to all your devices.”35  The press release went on to explain that 
“[w]hen anything changes on one of your devices, all of your devices are 
wirelessly updated almost instantly.”36  The late Steve Jobs, Apple’s CEO at 
the time of iCloud’s release, is quoted as saying, “All of this happens 
automatically and wirelessly, and because it’s integrated into our apps you 
don’t even need to think about it—it all just works.”37 
Cloud-computing services are extremely easy to setup and connect to.  For 
example, Apple’s website states, “Set up iCloud on all your devices.  The rest 
is automatic.”38  The steps to set up iCloud on a device are as follows:  (1) 
“Make sure your device is running the latest version of [Apple’s proprietary 
operating system] iOS39”; (2) “Turn on iCloud”; (3) “Enable automatic 
downloads”; (4) “Use iCloud on all of your devices.”40  Because all of the 
applications that run on an iPhone or iPad, including Calendar and Messages, 
run on iOS, it is virtually impossible to use one of these devices without first 
setting up an iCloud account.41 
Google Drive is Google’s equivalent to iCloud.  Google Drive is a “safe 
place for all your files” and you can “see your stuff anywhere” as “files in 
Drive can be reached from any smartphone, tablet, or computer.”42  On 
Google Drive, a user can access email and store any type of file including 
photos and videos.43  Microsoft OneDrive also functions like iCloud and 
Google Drive.44  A user can get “files from anywhere, on any device” and 
can access email while also sharing files and photos.45 
 
 34. See Press Release, Apple Inc., Apple Introduces iCloud (June 6, 2011) [hereinafter 
Apple Press Release], https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2011/06/06Apple-Introduces-
iCloud/ [https://perma.cc/7ZQV-QAMH]. 
 35. Id.  iCloud is not a revolutionary idea but reflects the evolution over time of 
technological advances to the point where cloud computing is now economically and 
technically feasible. See Gasser, supra note 24, at 5.  Apple brought the cloud to the average 
user but cloud systems such as Dropbox existed prior to the introduction of iCloud in 2011.  
For a discussion of Dropbox, see infra note 93.  
 36. Apple Press Release, supra note 34.  
 37. Id.  
 38. iCloud Setup, APPLE INC., http://www.apple.com/icloud/setup/ios.html 
[https://perma.cc/U2LW-55G9] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017).   
 39. iOS is the name for the operating system used on Apple iPhones and iPads. iOS 11, 
APPLE INC., https://www.apple.com/ios/ios-11/ [https://perma.cc/S23A-HPXH] (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2017) (referring to iOS as “[t]he world’s most advanced mobile operating system”).  
 40. iCloud Setup, supra note 38. 
 41. iOS 11, supra note 39. 
 42. GOOGLE DRIVE, https://www.google.com/drive/ [https://perma.cc/ZP8D-QC8C] (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2017).  
 43. Id.  
 44. OneDrive, MICROSOFT, https://www.onedrive.live.com/about/en-us/ 
[https://perma.cc/6YXD-4D4S] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017).  
 45. Id.  
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The purpose of iCloud, Google Drive, and OneDrive is for the user to store 
all of her data on the cloud, including passwords to applications and email, 
and sync it with all of her devices for easy access without ever having to think 
about it once the account has been set up.46  Part of Apple’s website 
highlights this “seamless experience” and explains that a user can start typing 
an email or text message on one device and through iCloud, complete the 
message and respond on another device.47 
With a better understanding of these cloud-computing systems, it is evident 
how easy it is for personal information to end up on a variety of devices.  
After considering the prevalence of situations like the one outlined in the 
Introduction, one can also see how effortlessly information can end up in the 
hands of an unintended recipient. 
B.  How the CFAA Came to Criminalize Computer Usage 
That “Exceeds Authorized Access” 
In 1984, Congress passed the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act of 198448—the first federal statute to criminalize 
unauthorized access to computers.49  The original statute solely protected 
classified information, financial records, and credit information stored on 
computers owned by the government and financial institutions.50 
Congress then became increasingly concerned with problems of computer 
fraud and abuse as computers were beginning to become more widespread 
among businesses, individuals, and the government.51  Technological 
advances also created a new type of crime in which individuals used 
computers to steal, defraud, and abuse the property of others.52  Courts 
initially attempted to fit computer crimes into traditional property law, but 
because much of the property in a computer crime is intangible, there were 
substantial issues with this approach.53 
In 1986, Congress ultimately decided the law should be updated to address 
these types of crimes because existing law could not accommodate abuses of 
evolving technology.54  Thus, the Act from 1984 was renamed the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act.55  In addition to financial crimes, the Senate found that 
 
 46. See e.g., Apple Press Release, supra note 34; see also supra note 38 and 
accompanying text.  
 47. iOS 11, supra note 39. 
 48. Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-473, § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 2190, 2190–92 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)). 
 49. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 6 (1984).  There is also a civil right of action in the 
statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g). 
 50. Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984 § 2102(a)(1)–
(3). 
 51. See S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 2 (1986).  
 52. See id.  
 53. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-612, at 5 (1986); see also Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope:  
Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1596, 1605–07 (2003). 
 54. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-612, at 5. 
 55. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Pub. L. No. 99-474, § 2, 100 Stat. 1213, 1213 (1986) 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)). 
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computer hacking could lead to life-threatening concerns if someone were to 
gain access to hospital records or government computers.56  The Senate also 
determined that “[f]ederal criminal penalties for computer crime are an 
appropriate punishment for certain acts and can serve to deter would-be 
computer criminals.”57 
The Senate, intending to enact an antihacking statute, rejected the idea to 
enact a sweeping federal statute to prevent all computer crimes and instead 
limited federal jurisdiction to computer crimes where there was a compelling 
federal interest.58  This included situations “where computers of the Federal 
Government or certain financial institutions [were] involved, or where the 
crime itself [was] interstate in nature.”59 
In 1996, Congress passed another amendment to the CFAA, which 
expanded the scope of § 1030(a)(2)(C) of the statute.60  Previously, the 
CFAA was limited in its protection of unauthorized access,61 but the 1996 
amendment made it a violation of federal law to intentionally access 
information from any protected computer without authorization or by 
exceeding authorized access.62  This part of the statute has not been amended 
since 1996, thus the text of this provision remains the same.63  The statute 
defines “protected computer” as “a computer which is used in or affecting 
interstate or foreign commerce or communication . . . .”64  The internet is 
considered to be an instrumentality and channel of interstate commerce, so 
every computer connected to the internet is a “protected computer” under the 
CFAA.65  In addition, Congress previously determined that “obtain[ing] 
information” could encompass solely reading the information, which further 
highlights the expansive reach of the 1996 amendment.66 
 
 56. S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 2–3. 
 57. Id. at 3.  
 58. See id. at 4. 
 59. Id.; see also infra note 65 and accompanying text (explaining that the internet is 
considered to be an instrumentality and channel of interstate commerce).  
 60. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, § 201, 110 Stat. 3491, 3491–
94. 
 61. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (explaining how § 1030 initially protected 
only classified information, financial records, and credit information stored on computers 
owned by the government and financial institutions). 
 62. See Economic Espionage Act § 201. 
 63. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2012) (“Whoever intentionally accesses a computer 
without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains information from any 
protected computer shall be punished . . . .”). 
 64. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B). 
 65. See OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC., EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATTORNEYS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, PROSECUTING COMPUTER CRIMES 4 (2010); see also Kerr, supra note 13, at 1568. 
 66. See S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 6 (1986) (noting that “obtaining information” in the statute 
includes “mere observation of the data”).  In 2012, Senator Amy Klobuchar from Minnesota 
proposed the Cloud Computing Act of 2012. See S. 3569, 112th Cong. (2012).  This bill 
attempted to “improve the enforcement of criminal and civil law with respect to cloud 
computing.” Id.  Although Congress did not pass this bill, it would have given cloud-
computing systems more specific and increased protection under the CFAA. Eric Goldman, 
The Proposed “Cloud Computing Act of 2012,” and How Internet Regulation Can Go Awry, 
FORBES (Oct. 2, 2012, 12:01 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2012/10/02/the-
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Although the CFAA was originally enacted to target computer hackers,67 
the statute has been greatly expanded not only by these congressional 
amendments but also by later interpretation by the courts.68  As the scope of 
the CFAA has grown, it has become one of the most widely prosecuted 
criminal statutes.69  This is relevant to the hypothetical outlined in the 
Introduction because, while that situation is not a “hack” in the traditional 
sense, under the expansive reach of the CFAA, that tablet user could fall 
within the statute’s purview.70 
Though there are many provisions of the CFAA, § 1030(a)(2)(C)71 is most 
applicable to the hypothetical situation previously discussed because it 
encompasses all “protected computers.”72  Courts commonly interpret all of 
§ 1030(a)(2) in the employment context because employers or the 
government often use this provision to bring suits against former employees 
for exceeding authorized computer access in a way that either harms the 
company or is criminal.73  Unfortunately, there is little guidance for courts 
when applying the CFAA outside of the employment context, especially to 
situations involving the cloud.74 
According to the statute, the term “exceeds authorized access” from 
§ 1030(a)(2) means “to access a computer with authorization and to use such 
access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not 
entitled so to obtain or alter.”75  The term “without authorization” from the 
same section is not defined. 
Under the statute, computer intruders can be classified into two categories:  
“insiders” and “outsiders.”76  The phrase “without authorization” applies to 
 
proposed-cloud-computing-act-of-2012-and-how-internet-regulation-can-go-awry/ 
[https://perma.cc/J8GJ-UZYR].   
 67. Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary defines “hacker” as “a person who secretly gets access 
to a computer system in order to get information, cause damage, etc.” Hacker, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/hacker 
[https://perma.cc/C2MU-RRPJ] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017). 
 68. See S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 3–4; see also Shawn E. Tuma, “What Does CFAA Mean 
and Why Should I Care?”—A Primer on the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act for Civil 
Litigators, 63 S.C. L. REV. 141, 155–56 (2011); infra Part II.  
 69. Sebastian E. Kaplan, The Rise of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Case, FENWICK & 
WEST LLP (Mar. 20, 2012), https://www.fenwick.com/FenwickDocuments/2012-03-
20_Rise_Computer_Fraud_Abuse_Case.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3V8-G3JF] (“Since 2002, 
complaints alleging a cause of action under the CFAA have increased nearly 600%.”). 
 70. See infra Part II.  
 71. For the text of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C), see supra note 63.  Section 1030(a)(2)(A) 
and (B) are similar provisions that both say “[w]hoever intentionally accesses a computer 
without authorization or exceeds authorized access,” but they apply to information contained 
in a financial record of a financial institution or information from any department or agency 
of the United States, respectively, rather than a protected computer. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1030(a)(2)(A)–(B) (2012). 
 72. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 73. See infra Part II.  
 74. See infra Part II; see also infra note 93 (discussing a case that does involve the CFAA 
as it relates to the cloud but is still in the employment context).   
 75. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6).  
 76. See Samantha Jensen, Abusing the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act:  Why Broad 
Interpretations of the CFAA Fail, 36 HAMLINE L. REV. 81, 90 (2013); Keim, supra note 20, at 
31–32; Tuma, supra note 68, at 175–76.  
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outside hackers who have no authority to access a computer or server.77  It is 
fairly obvious when traditional outside hackers, such as Edward Majerczyk,78 
have accessed a computer “without authorization” because they have no 
connection to the affected computer and likely breached some type of 
security to access the information on the computer or server.79  The phrase 
“exceeds authorized access” applies to inside hackers who are typically an 
employee or a friend who has (or had) authorization to access a computer 
system but abuses that access privilege.80 
The circuits are split on how authorization under § 1030(a)(2) should be 
construed as applied to inside hackers.81  The varying views focus on the 
meaning of the term “exceeds authorized access.”82  This term has led to 
much discussion in the employment context because employees who are said 
to have violated the CFAA often have some access rights to the employer’s 
computer system as part of their job.83  A broad interpretation and a narrow 
interpretation emerged from various circuit court cases.84  The broad view 
applies to the misuse of information properly attained while the narrow view 
is limited to violations of access restrictions and holds that the CFAA does 
not cover misuse.85  More specifically, according to the narrow view, “[a]n 
inside hacker has permission to access limited information on a computer, 
 
 77. See Garrett D. Urban, Causing Damage Without Authorization:  The Limitations of 
Current Judicial Interpretations of Employee Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1369, 1371–72 (2011). 
 78. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text.  
 79. See Urban, supra note 77, at 1371–72. 
 80. See Keim, supra note 20, at 31 (citing NAT’L CYBERSECURITY & COMMC’NS 
INTEGRATION CTR., COMBATING THE INSIDER THREAT (2014)).  To the extent that Congress 
was attempting to differentiate between access to the computer itself and the level of 
permission to obtain information on the computer, these two terms have caused confusion 
among the courts. See Keim, supra note 20, at 32. When interpreting the CFAA, the courts 
have blurred the difference between these two terms even though “without authorization” 
typically applies to outside hackers and “exceeds authorized access” applies to inside hackers. 
See Tuma, supra note 68, at 174.  For example, according to the court in International Airport 
Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006), “[t]he difference between ‘without 
authorization’ and ‘exceeding authorized access’ is paper thin, but not quite invisible.” Id. at 
420.  The court in United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009), does not 
differentiate between the two terms. Id. at 461.  Courts sometimes use the two terms 
interchangeably when discussing unauthorized access by inside hackers.  In the hypothetical 
from the Introduction, the friend, significant other, or coworker who “exceeds authorized 
access” when initially requesting to borrow a tablet to browse the internet but actually accesses 
personal information that is stored on the cloud can be classified as an inside hacker. See Keim, 
supra note 20, at 31.  For further exploration of this idea, see infra Part II. 
 81. See infra Part II. 
 82. See infra Part II; see also supra note 80 (explaining how courts do not always 
distinguish between “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access” and they are 
sometimes used interchangeably when referencing inside hackers).  
 83. See Urban, supra note 77, at 1372. 
 84. See David J. Schmitt, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Should Not Apply to the 
Misuse of Information Accessed with Permission, 47 CREIGHTON L. REV. 423, 424 (2014); see 
also infra Part II.  In jurisdictions that follow the narrow interpretation, fewer people are 
prosecuted under the statute because the CFAA’s reach is more limited.  Under the broad view, 
the reach of the CFAA is more expansive and, therefore, more computer users are considered 
violators of federal law.  
 85. See infra Part II.  
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but obtains other information on the computer the user did not have 
permission to access.”86  The broad view, by contrast, “appl[ies] to users who 
have permission to access computer information, but who ‘misuse’ the 
information obtained with permission.”87 
The narrow view is overwhelmingly more popular among scholars, and 
many articles in this area advocate for courts to adopt the narrow approach88 
or more specifically, to adopt the narrow code-based approach discussed 
below.89  The main argument in favor of a version of the narrow approach is 
that the broad view would overcriminalize computer usage and the narrow 
approach more accurately aligns with Congress’s original intent in enacting 
this antihacking statute:  to deter and punish outside hackers.90  The U.S. 
Supreme Court and Congress have yet to resolve this legal dispute and 
determine the prevailing interpretation of “exceeds authorized access” within 
the CFAA.91 
II.  THE COMPETING VIEWS OF “EXCEEDS AUTHORIZED ACCESS” 
BY INSIDERS UNDER THE CFAA 
AND THEIR APPLICATION TO THE CLOUD 
Congress intended for the CFAA to encompass changes in technology, so 
a court would likely determine that the reach of the CFAA extends to cloud-
computing systems, although they were not widely used in the late 1980s 
when Congress passed the statute.92  At least one court has interpreted 
authorization under the CFAA in the employment context as it relates to 
insiders accessing data on the cloud,93 but cases involving both the cloud and 
 
 86. Schmitt, supra note 84, at 432. 
 87. Id. at 432–33. 
 88. See generally Jensen, supra note 76; Schmitt, supra note 84; Pamela Taylor, To Steal 
or Not to Steal:  An Analysis of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and Its Effect on 
Employers, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 201 (2012); see also infra Part II.B (discussing the narrow view).  
 89. See generally Katherine Mesenbring Field, Agency, Code, or Contract:  Determining 
Employees’ Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 107 MICH. L. REV. 819 
(2009); Kerr, supra note 53; Kelsey T. Patterson, Narrowing It Down to One Narrow View:  
Clarifying and Limiting the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 7 CHARLESTON L. REV. 489 
(2013); see also infra Part II.B.3 (explaining the narrow code-based approach).   
 90. See generally Schmitt, supra note 84.  
 91. See Tuma, supra note 68, at 154.  In recent years, Congress has unsuccessfully 
attempted to resolve the circuit split by proposing an amendment to clarify the meaning of 
authorization under § 1030.  One such amendment, known as Aaron’s Law Act of 2015, was 
introduced in both Houses on April 21, 2015, and proposed striking the definition of “exceeds 
authorized access” from § 1030(e)(6) and inserting a definition of “access without 
authorization.” H.R. 1918, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 1030, 114th Cong. (2015).  The suggested 
definition of “without authorization” was “to obtain information on a protected computer; that 
the accesser lacks authorization to obtain; and by knowingly circumventing one or more 
technological or physical measures that are designed to exclude or prevent unauthorized 
individuals from obtaining that information.” H.R. 1918; S. 1030.  Congress has not passed 
this bill. 
 92. See S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 5 (1996); see also supra notes 15–17 and accompanying 
text.   
 93. See Frisco Med. Ctr., L.L.P. v. Bledsoe, 147 F. Supp. 3d 646, 652 (E.D. Tex. 2015).  
In this case, the defendants were hospital employees who exceeded their authorization and 
violated § 1030(a)(2)(C) of the CFAA when they used Dropbox to upload confidential files 
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the CFAA are limited.  Instead, the main views to defining authorization have 
emerged from case law specific to discussions of insiders accessing a 
computer in the employment context without mention of the cloud. 
Within the narrow and broad interpretations of authorization under the 
CFAA, courts use varying approaches to explain the definition of “exceeds 
authorized access” as applied to inside hackers.94  These approaches are 
classified as (1) the broad agency view, (2) the broad contract-based view, 
(3) the narrow contract-based view, and (4) the narrow code-based view.  Part 
II.A discusses the broad approaches to interpreting the CFAA while Part II.B 
analyzes the narrow approaches.  Both Parts apply these interpretations to the 
hypothetical from the Introduction to show how they would operate in a 
context outside of the employer-employee relationship.95 
A.  The Broad View:  Misuse of Information 
Properly Obtained Is Sufficient 
for Insiders to “Exceed[] Authorized Access” 
When applying the broad view of the CFAA, courts in the First, Fifth, 
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have explored the misuse of information 
properly obtained—the broad standard96 for determining when an insider 
“exceeds authorized access”—using different lenses.97  These two lenses are 
the broad agency approach and the broad contract-based approach.  Part 
II.A.1 analyzes the broad agency approach and Part II.A.2 applies the broad 
agency approach to this Note’s cloud-computing hypothetical.  Then, Part 
II.A.3 discusses the broad contract-based approach and Part II.A.4 applies 
the broad contract-based approach to the same hypothetical. 
1.  The Broad View of the CFAA Under the Agency Approach 
The agency approach to interpreting the CFAA is grounded in agency 
law.98  The court in Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc., v. Safeguard Self 
 
from the hospital system to their home computer. Id. at 646, 652, 659.  Dropbox is an internet 
service that “uses ‘cloud’ storage to enable users to store and share files with others across the 
Internet using file synchronization.  When files are uploaded to Dropbox by a user, they 
automatically ‘sync’ with another computer selected by the user, meaning that the files are 
transferred from one computer to another.” Id. at 652.  Dropbox is another cloud-computing 
system that functions like iCloud, Google Drive, and OneDrive. See DROPBOX, 
https://www.dropbox.com [https://perma.cc/L4TY-AKXN] (last visited Oct. 16, 2017); see 
also supra Part I.A (explaining the function and purpose of the cloud).  
 94. See supra note 80 (explaining how the courts have blurred the difference between 
“without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access” and often use the terms 
interchangeably).  This Note’s focus is on the CFAA as a criminal statute.  Though some of 
the cases discussed in Part II are brought in the civil context, there is no difference in how the 
interpretations of “exceeds authorized access” are applied to criminal versus civil cases.  
 95. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  
 96. See supra text accompanying note 85. 
 97. See generally United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. John, 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010); Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 
(7th Cir. 2006); EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001).  
 98. See Field, supra note 89, at 823; Jensen, supra note 76, at 103. 
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Storage, Inc.99 was the first to apply agency theory to interpret the CFAA.100  
The plaintiff Shurgard Storage Centers and the defendant Safeguard Self 
Storage were competitors in the self-storage business.101  The defendant 
offered Eric Leland, a manager of the plaintiff, a position with its 
company.102  While still an employee of Shurgard but acting as an agent for 
Safeguard, Leland used his position at Shurgard to access confidential 
information, which he then emailed to Safeguard.103  Shurgard alleged that 
Safeguard violated § 1030(a)(2)(C) of the CFAA.104  When making its 
decision, the court relied upon section 112 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Agency which states that, “[u]nless otherwise agreed, the authority of an 
agent terminates if, without knowledge of the principal, he acquires adverse 
interests or if he is otherwise guilty of a serious breach of loyalty to the 
principal.”105  The court explained that “when Mr. Leland or other former 
employees used the plaintiff’s computers and information on those 
computers in an improper way they were ‘without authorization.’”106  
Though the court did not find it necessary to subsequently determine whether 
Leland had also “exceed[ed] authorized access” under the CFAA, courts 
often do not differentiate between “exceeds authorized access” and “without 
authorization” when interpreting the statute.107 
The Seventh Circuit similarly adopted the broad agency approach in 
International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin.108  International Airport 
Centers (IAC) employed Citrin to identify properties that IAC might want to 
acquire and IAC lent Citrin a laptop to use in the course of his 
employment.109  When Citrin decided to leave his position at IAC, he deleted 
the data on the laptop using a secure erasure program before returning it.110  
IAC alleged that Citrin violated § 1030(a)(5)(A)(i) of the CFAA when he 
erased the laptop.111 
 
 99. 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (W.D. Wash. 2000).  
 100. See Jensen, supra note 76, at 104.  
 101. Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1122.  
 102. Id. at 1123.  
 103. Id.  
 104. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2012).  
 105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112 (AM. LAW INST. 1958); see also Shurgard 
Storage Ctrs., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1124–25. 
 106. Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1124. 
 107. See id. at 1125 n.4; see also supra note 80 (explaining how courts have blurred the 
difference between “without authorization” and “exceeds authorized access”). 
 108. 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006).  
 109. Id. at 419. 
 110. Id.  
 111. See id.  The section of the CFAA quoted in this opinion has since been amended and 
is now § 1030(a)(5)(A).  This provision states, “Whoever knowingly causes the transmission 
of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally 
causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer; shall be punished as provided 
in subsection (c) of this section.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) (2012).  Despite this section’s 
inapplicability to the hypothetical introduced earlier in this Note, the reasoning that the 
Seventh Circuit applies is still applicable to the other sections of the statute, including 
§ 1030(a)(2)(C). 
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The court, in an opinion written by Judge Richard A. Posner, relied on 
agency law to determine that Citrin violated the CFAA by misusing 
information properly obtained.112  The court explained, “Citrin’s breach of 
his duty of loyalty terminated his agency relationship . . . and with it his 
authority to access the laptop, because the only basis of his authority had been 
that relationship.”113  Like the court in Shurgard, the court here referenced 
section 112 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency,114 but also relied on 
another section in making this determination.115 
Although Citrin was still an employee when he accessed and deleted the 
files, he terminated his agency relationship with IAC when he elected to quit 
and therefore he no longer had access to use the laptop.116  Under this 
approach, a breach of the duty of loyalty leads to a violation of the CFAA 
regardless of the employer’s ignorance of any breach.117  The Seventh Circuit 
concluded that an employee acts “without authorization” or “exceeds 
authorized access” when his interests are no longer aligned with the 
employer’s.118  The court adopted the broad approach to the CFAA by 
focusing on computer misuse by the employee, rather than an access 
restriction put in place by the employer, in determining that Citrin violated 
the CFAA.119 
2.  The Broad Agency View Applied to the Cloud 
Under the broad agency view of authorization, as interpreted by the courts 
in the employment setting, an employee “exceeds authorized access” when 
she acquires interests that are adverse to the employer or breaches the duty 
of loyalty by misusing information that was otherwise properly obtained.120  
Although the same rules of agency theory do not apply in the hypothetical 
from the Introduction because the hypothetical is not based in the 
employment context, the reasoning is still applicable.  An individual who 
accesses another’s cloud account and obtains personal information still 
acquires interests adverse to the owner of the device and could misuse the 
information, thus “exceed[ing] authorized access” in the same way.121  
Consequently, when applying the broad agency approach of authorization 
outside of the employment context to a scenario involving cloud computing, 
 
 112. See Int’l Airport Ctrs., 440 F.3d at 420–21. 
 113. Id.  
 114. See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text.  
 115. See Int’l Airport Ctrs., 440 F.3d at 420; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 
§ 387 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (“Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to his 
principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his 
agency.”). 
 116. See Int’l Airport Ctrs., 440 F.3d at 419–21.  
 117. See id. at 421.  
 118. Id. at 420–21. 
 119. See id.; see also Patterson, supra note 89, at 502. 
 120. See Int’l Airport Ctrs., 440 F.3d at 420–21; see also supra Part II.A.1.  
 121. See Int’l Airport Ctrs., 440 F.3d at 420–21; see also Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc., v. 
Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1124–25 (W.D. Wash. 2000).   
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an individual in this Note’s hypothetical situation could also be found to 
violate the CFAA. 
3.  The Broad View of the CFAA 
Under the Contract-Based Approach 
In the employment setting, some courts apply contract principles to the 
misuse of computer information.  Using this interpretation, an individual may 
be liable under the CFAA when she violates an implicit or explicit contract 
between the two parties that outlines the employee’s authorization to use a 
computer.122  In EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc.,123 Philip Gormley, 
an Explorica employee, signed a confidentiality agreement when previously 
employed by Explorica’s competitor, EF, which prohibited him from 
disclosing any of EF’s confidential information to any third party.124  In his 
new position at Explorica, Gormley used proprietary information from his 
experience at EF to assist in creating a program for Explorica to record large 
amounts of information from EF’s website, which was used to undercut EF’s 
prices.125  EF sued Explorica alleging that the use of this software program 
violated the CFAA.126 
The First Circuit analyzed the CFAA definition of “exceeds authorized 
access” and determined that Explorica’s use of EF’s travel codes was beyond 
the usual authorized purpose of EF’s website.127  In addition, Gormley 
breached his confidentiality agreement by misusing information to assist in 
creating the program, thereby exceeding his authorization in using EF’s 
website.128  In short, the First Circuit applied the broad contract-based 
interpretation of the CFAA and decided that Explorica and Gormley 
“exceed[ed] authorized access” by engaging in computer misuse and that the 
contract that existed between the parties limited Explorica’s authorization.129 
The Fifth Circuit also adopted the broad contract-based view of the CFAA 
in its opinion in United States v. John,130 when it held that an employee could 
violate the CFAA by “exceed[ing] authorized access” under an employer’s 
computer-use policy.131  The court reasoned that authorization includes limits 
placed on the use of information properly obtained “when the user knows or 
reasonably should know that he or she is not authorized to access a computer 
and information obtainable from that access [is] in furtherance of or to 
perpetrate a crime.”132 
The defendant, Eva-Lavon John, obtained customer information that she 
was authorized to access and misused that information by providing it to her 
 
 122. See Field, supra note 89, at 827.  
 123. 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001).  
 124. Id. at 582.  
 125. Id. at 582–83.  
 126. Id. at 577–78.  
 127. Id. at 583. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See generally id. 
 130. 597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010).  
 131. See id. at 272. 
 132. Id. at 271.  
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half brother who then used the information to engage in fraud.133  She was 
convicted of a criminal violation of the CFAA for “exceed[ing] authorized 
access” to a protected computer under § 1030(a)(2)(A) and (C).134  The court 
held that John’s use of this information violated employee policies because 
her access to the computer systems was limited in that she could only access 
the customer information for business reasons.135  The Fifth Circuit agreed 
with the First Circuit’s reasoning in EF Cultural Travel BV136 and held that 
an employee could “exceed[] authorized access” and violate the CFAA by 
exceeding the purpose for which access was initially given.137 
In addition to the First and Fifth Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit in United 
States v. Rodriguez138 also followed the broad contract-based approach to 
interpreting authorization under the CFAA.  The court held that the 
defendant, Roberto Rodriguez, violated § 1030(a)(2)(B)139 when he accessed 
personal information in the Social Security Administration database for 
nonbusiness reasons.140  The court reasoned that Rodriguez’s use of the 
database violated the administration’s policy.141  Thus, it was irrelevant that 
Rodriguez only accessed information that he was authorized to obtain.142  
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit held Rodriguez exceeded his access to the 
computer system when he misused information, consequently violating the 
CFAA.143 
4.  The Broad Contract-Based View Applied to the Cloud 
Under the broad contract-based view of the CFAA in the employment 
context, an employee is found to violate the statute by misusing information 
and breaching an implicit or explicit contract outlining authorization for 
computer usage.144  The explicit contract between the parties can be a 
 
 133. Id. at 269.  
 134. Id. at 269–70.  Section 1030(a)(2)(A) says, “Whoever intentionally accesses a 
computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains information 
contained in a financial record of a financial institution, or of a card issuer[,] . . . or contained 
in a file of a consumer reporting agency on a consumer . . . shall be punished . . . .” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1030(a)(2)(A) (2012).  Although § 1030(a)(2)(A) is not the focus of this Note, the reasoning 
of the court in this case is still applicable because John also violated § 1030(a)(2)(C), and both 
sections involve “exceed[ing] authorized access.” See also supra note 71.  
 135. John, 597 F.3d at 271–72.  
 136. For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 123–29 and accompanying text.  
 137. See John, 597 F.3d at 272.  
 138. 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010).  
 139. Section 1030(a)(2)(B) says, “Whoever intentionally accesses a computer without 
authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains information from any 
department or agency of the United States shall be punished . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(B).  
Though this section of the CFAA is not applicable to the hypothetical proposed in the 
Introduction, the court’s reasoning in Rodriguez applies because § 1030(a)(2)(B) still involves 
“exceed[ing] authorized access.” See supra note 71.  
 140. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d at 1263.  
 141. Id.  
 142. Id.  
 143. Id.  
 144. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing implicit and explicit contracts); 
see also supra Part II.A.3.   
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confidentiality agreement,145 computer-use policy,146 or employment 
policy.147 
Although this Note’s hypothetical contains no explicit written contract or 
policy and takes place outside the employment context, this interpretation of 
CFAA violations also encompasses implicit contracts.148  The hypothetical 
arguably involves an implicit oral contract because it can be implied that the 
tablet was lent out after a verbal agreement that it would be used for internet 
browsing purposes only.  According to Black’s Law Dictionary, an oral or 
parol contract is “a contract . . . that is not in writing or is only partially in 
writing.”149  The law recognizes oral contracts although written contracts are 
usually preferred.150 
If the tablet user from the hypothetical scenario misuses her authorized 
access to the internet to instead view something like the device owner’s 
Google Drive account, which is on the cloud and accessible through the 
internet browser, she arguably breaches the oral contract between the two 
parties.151  These actions could be considered a misuse of information and a 
violation of the CFAA because although the tablet user was allowed to access 
the internet browser, that access was limited.152  The user arguably 
“exceed[ed] authorized access” because she exceeded the purpose for which 
authorization was given when she viewed cloud data available through the 
browser.153 
B.  The Narrow View:  Violations of Access Restrictions 
Is Sufficient for Insiders to “Exceed[] Authorized Access” 
Courts in the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits follow the narrow view—
rather than the broad view—of interpreting authorization for insiders for 
purposes of the CFAA.154  Under this more limited view, an individual 
violates the CFAA when she has permission to access information on a 
computer but instead obtains other information on the computer that she 
lacked permission to access.155  In these jurisdictions, unlike in jurisdictions 
that follow the broad view, the CFAA is not applicable when an individual 
 
 145. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.  See generally EF Cultural Travel BV v. 
Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001). 
 146. See supra notes 130–32 and accompanying text.  See generally United States v. John, 
597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 147. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.  See generally Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258.  
 148. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 149. Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining parol contract).  
Another name for parol contract is “oral contract.” Id. 
 150. See Fenix Enters., Inc. v. M & M Mortg. Corp., 624 F. Supp. 2d 834, 841–42 (S.D. 
Ohio 2009). 
 151. See supra Parts I.A, II.A.3.  
 152. See, e.g., United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 271–72 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 153. See id.  
 154. See generally United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2015); WEC Carolina 
Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 
854 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 155. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.  
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misuses information that was properly obtained.156  When applying the 
narrow view, courts analyze violations of access restrictions by insiders using 
two different approaches:  the narrow contract-based approach and the 
narrow code-based approach.  Accordingly, Part II.B.1 explores the narrow 
contract-based approach and Part II.B.2 applies the narrow contract-based 
approach to this Note’s cloud-computing scenario. Then, Part II.B.3 
discusses the narrow code-based approach and Part II.B.4 applies the narrow 
code-based approach to the same scenario. 
1.  The Narrow View of the CFAA 
Under the Contract-Based Approach 
The narrow contract-based approach holds that there is no violation of the 
CFAA when an employer’s policy restricts an employee’s use of information 
rather than access to the information.157  Instead, under this approach, the 
CFAA is applicable only when an employee exceeds the employer’s 
authorized access.158 
The Ninth Circuit applied this narrow approach to authorization in United 
States v. Nosal.159  In this case, David Nosal, a former Korn/Ferry employee 
who left the company to start his own business, convinced some of his former 
coworkers to use their login credentials to download confidential information 
from Korn/Ferry and send it to Nosal.160  Korn/Ferry employees could access 
the database but there was a policy that restricted them from disclosing 
confidential information.161  Nosal was charged with violating 
§ 1030(a)(4)162 of the CFAA for aiding and abetting his former coworkers in 
exceeding their authorized access to the Korn/Ferry computers.163  The court 
reasoned that although Nosal’s accomplices misused the information they 
were authorized to access, Nosal had not violated the statute because the term 
“‘exceeds authorized access’ in the CFAA is limited to violations of 
restrictions on access to information, and not restrictions on its use.”164  
 
 156. See Schmitt, supra note 84, at 439; see also supra Part II.A.  
 157. See Schmitt, supra note 84, at 432–33.  
 158. See generally Valle, 807 F.3d 508; WEC Carolina Energy Sols., 687 F.3d 199; Nosal, 
676 F.3d 854.  
 159. 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 160. Id. at 856.  
 161. Id.  
 162. Section 1030(a)(4) provides:  
Whoever knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer 
without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct 
furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value, unless the object of the 
fraud and the thing obtained, consists only of the use of the computer and the value 
of such use is not more than $5,000 in any 1-year period shall be punished . . . .”  
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2012).  It is not likely that an individual who obtains access to another 
individual’s cloud-computing system would violate this section of the CFAA but the reasoning 
that the court applies is still applicable to the other sections of the statute including 
§ 1030(a)(2)(C).  
 163. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4). 
 164. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 863–64.  
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Therefore, the government’s charges failed to meet the elements of “without 
authorization” or “exceeds authorized access” under the statute.165 
The Ninth Circuit explained that if the CFAA applied broadly to use 
restrictions and violations of the duty of loyalty rather than access 
restrictions,166 then the CFAA would become too expansive.167  For example, 
using a work computer for personal use is commonly prohibited by employer 
computer-use policies.168  According to the court in Nosal, if it adopted the 
broad view, employees who used personal email at work or checked sports 
scores on ESPN could be subject to criminal liability under the CFAA.169  
The court reasoned that “[i]f Congress meant to expand the scope of criminal 
liability to everyone who uses a computer in violation of computer use 
restrictions—which may well include everyone who uses a computer—we 
would expect it to use language better suited to that purpose.”170 
Like the Ninth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit in WEC Carolina Energy 
Solutions LLC v. Miller171 also adopted the narrow contract-based approach.  
There, defendant Mike Miller resigned as an employee for WEC and later 
made a presentation to a potential WEC customer as a representative for his 
new employer, Arc Energy Service, Inc., a competitor of WEC.172  After the 
customer chose to work with Arc over WEC, WEC alleged that when Miller 
was still an employee, he downloaded confidential information from WEC’s 
system, emailed this information to his personal email address, and used it to 
win over the potential customer.173  Miller was privy to this information as 
part of his employment, but WEC had a policy that prohibited using 
confidential information without authorization or downloading the 
information to a personal computer.174  WEC sued Miller claiming he 
violated multiple provisions of the CFAA including § 1030(a)(2)(C).175 
The court concluded that “an employee ‘exceeds authorized access’ when 
he has approval to access a computer, but uses his access to obtain or alter 
information that falls outside the bounds of his approved access.”176  The 
court also noted that this interpretation does not extend to the misuse of 
information properly obtained.177  The Fourth Circuit agreed with the Ninth 
Circuit’s opinion in Nosal and determined that when an employee has access 
 
 165. Id. at 864.  
 166. Id. at 862–63; supra Part II.A.  
 167. See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 857. 
 168. See id. at 860.  
 169. Id.  
 170. Id. at 857.  Courts and scholars have expressed concern about overcriminalization of 
the CFAA because if authorization is interpreted too broadly, many everyday computer 
activities could become violations of the CFAA. See id. at 860; see also Patterson, supra note 
89, at 513; supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.  This is one of the main arguments 
against the broad view of interpreting authorization.  
 171. 687 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 172. Id. at 201.  
 173. Id. at 202. 
 174. Id.  
 175. Id. at 203.  WEC alleged that Miller also violated § 1030(a)(4), (a)(5)(B), and 
(a)(5)(C). Id. 
 176. Id. at 204.  
 177. Id. 
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to information and then misuses the information, his “manner” of access 
remains valid.178  Thus, Miller was not liable under the CFAA for the 
improper use of information accessed with authorization.179  The court also 
rejected the broad agency and broad contract approaches for reasons that are 
similar to those relied on by the Ninth Circuit in Nosal.180 
Most recently, in United States v. Valle,181 the Second Circuit followed the 
Ninth and Fourth Circuits and adopted the narrow contract-based 
approach.182  The Second Circuit determined that Valle did not “exceed[] 
authorized access” when he used his authorization to a computer program, 
which allows police officers to search secure databases, for a purpose 
unrelated to his employment.183  The court reasoned that although Valle 
violated the terms of his employment, he did not violate the CFAA because 
he only used his computer access to obtain information that he was authorized 
to view; thus, his misuse of this information for personal reasons was 
irrelevant.184 
2.  The Narrow Contract-Based View 
Applied to the Cloud 
Under the narrow contract-based view of authorization in the employment 
context, an employee “exceeds authorized access” when she has approval, 
through a contract such as an employment policy, to access a computer but 
goes beyond the scope of that approval to access additional information.185  
This approach does not apply to the misuse of information properly 
obtained.186 
Although there is no written contract in this Note’s hypothetical involving 
the cloud, there likely was a parol or oral contract between the two parties 
that usage of the tablet would be for internet browsing only.187  Therefore, 
accessing personal information like messages, emails, or pictures that are on 
the device because they are stored in the cloud, would qualify as “exceed[ing] 
authorized access.”188  This would be a violation of the CFAA under the 
narrow contract-based approach because the tablet user went beyond the 
 
 178. See id. at 205; supra notes 159–70 and accompanying text (discussing the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012)).  
 179. See WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC, 687 F.3d at 205.  
 180. See id. at 206; supra notes 167–70 and accompanying text (noting the Nosal court’s 
explanation of the possible far-reaching effects of the broad interpretation of authorization 
under the CFAA and that this interpretation was not intended by Congress).  
 181. 807 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2015).  
 182. See id. at 527; see also Michael L. Levy, A Proposed Amendment to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1030—The Problem of Employee Theft, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1591, 1600–01 (2016).  
 183. Valle, 807 F.3d at 523.  
 184. See id. at 523–24.   
 185. See, e.g., United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 859 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 186. See WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2012); 
supra note 177 and accompanying text.  
 187. See supra notes 149–50 and accompanying text (defining parol contracts).   
 188. See supra Part II.B.1.  
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scope of her authorization when she accessed information outside of the 
internet browser that she was not permitted to access.189 
The Northern District of California faced a factually analogous situation 
to this Note’s hypothetical scenario in Weingand v. Harland Financial 
Solutions, Inc.,190 and came to a similar conclusion, though the cloud was not 
a factor.  There, Harland brought CFAA charges against its former employee, 
Weingand, arguing that after termination, Weingand received permission to 
access Harland’s computer system to retrieve his “personal files” but that he 
did not have authorization to access the additional business files that he 
copied.191  The court determined that there was “a reasonable inference that 
[Weingand’s] authorization extended only to accessing and copying said 
‘personal files’ and that he exceeded that authorization” when he accessed 
company files.192  Thus, Harland had a valid claim against Weingand under 
the CFAA.193  This result may help to understand the hypothetical scenario 
discussed above in which a user, who entered into an implied contract with a 
friend to use her device for the limited purpose of internet browsing, may be 
held liable under the CFAA for exceeding that authorization.  
3.  The Narrow View of the CFAA 
Under the Code-Based Approach 
The narrow code-based view of authorization under the CFAA is the 
narrowest approach, which was first proposed by scholar Orin Kerr and has 
been advocated for by other academics.194  Unlike the agency approach and 
the contract-based approach, this interpretation requires a user to bypass 
security measures intended to restrict access to a computer to trigger a 
violation of the CFAA.195  According to Professor Kerr, users can circumvent 
a code either by “engag[ing] in false identification” by using someone else’s 
password or by “exploit[ing] a weakness in the code within a program to 
cause the program to malfunction in a way that grants the user greater 
privileges.”196 
Although no circuit courts have explicitly adopted the narrow code-based 
approach, this approach is still one of the leading interpretations of the CFAA 
among academics197 and is referred to as the plain-meaning theory in some 
 
 189. See, e.g., Nosal, 676 F.3d at 860–61. 
 190. No. C-11-3109 EMC, 2012 WL 2327660 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2012).  
 191. See id. at *1–2.  
 192. Id. at *2.  The court relied on the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Nosal. See supra notes 
159–70 and accompanying text. 
 193. See Weingand, 2012 WL 2327660, at *2. 
 194. See generally Kerr, supra note 53; Patterson, supra note 89.  
 195. See Kerr, supra note 53, at 1644–45.  
 196. Id.  
 197. See Andrew T. Hernacki, A Vague Law in a Smartphone World:  Limiting the Scope 
of Unauthorized Access Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1543, 
1561 (2012); see also Patterson, supra note 89, at 506–10.  One scholar has noted that a 9th 
Circuit case is the “only recent circuit court opinion that seems to have implemented anything 
close to the code-based theory in the employment context.” Patterson, supra note 89, at 506–
10; see also LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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district court opinions.198  The courts that reach results consistent with the 
code-based approach look to the plain language of the CFAA to determine 
whether an individual has “exceed[ed] authorized access” rather than looking 
to outside sources such as the Restatement (Second) of Agency or contract 
theory.199  For instance, in Black & Decker (US), Inc. v. Smith,200 the court 
reviewed the text of the statute itself and determined that it would only look 
to other authorities if the language was ambiguous.201  The court also focused 
on the statute’s legislative history and was persuaded by Congress’s intent 
for enacting the CFAA.202  Because the CFAA is a criminal statute, under 
this view, courts apply the rule of lenity, which requires that ambiguities in a 
criminal statute be resolved in favor of the defendant.203  In Remedpar, Inc. 
v. Allparts Medical, LLC,204 the court analyzed the holding of Black & 
Decker and made a similar determination about the meaning of authorization 
under the CFAA.205 
4.  The Narrow Code-Based View 
Applied to the Cloud 
Under this final approach to interpreting authorization under the CFAA, a 
user violates the statute by engaging in “false identification” and 
circumventing a security measure intended to restrict access, such as a 
password.206  Cloud-computing systems are capable of storing the passwords 
for email or other applications so the account can be easily accessed in the 
future.207  Although the user in this Note’s hypothetical has permission to use 
the tablet and may have the passcode to unlock the device, she could arguably 
still “exceed[] authorized access” by opening any of the accounts accessible 
because the password is saved on the cloud.208  Because the tablet user’s 
authorization only extends to internet browsing, these actions could be 
considered “false identification” and a violation of the CFAA under this 
approach.209 
 
 198. See, e.g., Dresser-Rand Co. v. Jones, 957 F. Supp. 2d 610, 618 (E.D. Pa. 2013); 
JBCHoldings NY, LLC. v. Pakter, 931 F. Supp. 2d 514, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Remedpar, Inc. 
v. Allparts Med., LLC, 683 F. Supp. 2d 605, 616 (M.D. Tenn. 2010); Black & Decker (US), 
Inc. v. Smith, 568 F. Supp. 2d 929, 935 (W.D. Tenn. 2008); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, 
No. 6:05-CV-1580-ORL-31, 2006 WL 2683058, at *4–5 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2006).  
 199. See supra note 198; see also Urban supra note 77, at 1380 n.66.  
 200. 568 F. Supp. 2d 929 (W.D. Tenn. 2008). 
 201. See id. at 934–35.  
 202. See id.; see also supra Part I.B (discussing how Congress intended for the CFAA to 
be an antihacking statute). 
 203. Black & Decker, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 934–35. 
 204. 683 F. Supp. 2d 605 (M.D. Tenn. 2010). 
 205. See id. at 610–13.  
 206. See Kerr, supra note 53, at 1644; supra note 195 and accompanying text.  
 207. See supra Part I.A. 
 208. See supra Part II.B.3.  
 209. See Kerr, supra note 53, at 1644–45.  
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III.  AMENDING THE CFAA TO ADDRESS THE CLOUD WHEN 
NONE OF THE CURRENT INTERPRETATIONS OF 
“EXCEEDS AUTHORIZED ACCESS” SUFFICE 
Despite the circuit courts’ adoption of multiple different interpretations of 
what it means for insiders to “exceed[] authorized access,”210 the CFAA 
remains the dominant statute for addressing computer-based crimes and is 
relevant in most cases involving access to information on a computer.211  The 
statute was intended to incorporate technological advances that emerge over 
time—indeed, the CFAA as it is currently written can, in theory, encompass 
new advances that were not yet invented when the statute was drafted, such 
as the cloud.212  The cloud’s capabilities greatly expand the reach of the term 
“protected computer,” which leads to the possibility of increased violations 
of the CFAA under all four approaches of interpretation by insiders.213  Many 
of these potential violations should not be considered criminal under federal 
law, and the statute’s original drafters did not intend for them to be classified 
as such.214 
This Part argues that all four approaches to interpreting authorization under 
the CFAA are too broad when applied to cloud computing, resulting in the 
characterization of harmless computer users as hackers, and suggests an 
amendment to the statute to resolve this unjust result.  Part III.A proposes 
that, although the framework for interpreting the CFAA is applicable to 
situations involving authorization to access data on the cloud, all of the 
current interpretations to define authorization are overinclusive when applied 
to cloud computing.  Part III.B then advocates for an amendment to the 
CFAA to address access to the cloud specifically and to limit the reach of the 
CFAA in this area. 
A.  All Approaches to Interpreting “Exceeds Authorized Access” 
Produce an Inequitable Result When Applied to the Cloud 
Though cases involving cloud computing and the CFAA have started to 
make their way into the courts,215 the CFAA is commonly interpreted in the 
employment context.216  The circuit courts are split between different 
interpretations of what it means for insiders to “exceed[] authorized access” 
under the statute.217 
 
 210. See supra Part II. 
 211. See supra note 20.  This Note discusses a novel issue because while access to the cloud 
has been analyzed in terms of the Fourth Amendment, the scholarship applying the CFAA to 
the cloud is extremely limited despite the statute’s importance to prosecuting computer crimes 
and the cloud’s increasing prevalence. See text accompanying supra note 11.   
 212. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text.  
 213. See supra Part I.A. 
 214. See supra Part I.B.  
 215. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing Frisco Medical Center, L.L.P. 
v. Bledsoe, 147 F. Supp. 3d 646 (E.D. Texas 2015), a case involving Dropbox and the CFAA).  
 216. See supra Part II.  
 217. See supra Part II. 
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Many scholars advocate for the narrow interpretation to dominate.218  
There are an abundance of articles arguing for jurisdictions to adopt the 
narrow view generally or the narrow code-based view specifically.219  The 
predominant argument is that the broad view to interpreting the CFAA 
overcriminalizes actions taken by the average computer user and that some 
variation of the narrow view is the only way to read the statute adequately.220  
The problem with these arguments is that all four approaches to interpreting 
“exceeds authorized access” are too broad when applied to accessing data on 
the cloud and can support a finding that an innocuous computer user violated 
federal law.221  As such, the CFAA cannot adequately handle this new type 
of technology.222  The current interpretations of authorization would even 
unjustly classify this Note’s hypothetical tablet user as a violator of the 
CFAA.223 
Although the narrow view is likely the better way to interpret authorization 
under the CFAA, even this approach leads to overcriminalization of 
computer usage when applied to the cloud.224  Consequently, resolving the 
circuit split is unnecessary for the purpose of this Note, as none of the circuits 
have adopted an interpretation of authorization that is suitable when applied 
to accessing data on the cloud.225 
Some may believe that the current interpretations of authorization are fair 
because they punish anyone (whether an insider or an outsider) who exceeds 
authorization to a computer, but this view is not in line with the legislative 
history of the statute.226  The CFAA was initially enacted by Congress as an 
antihacking statute227 to provide a statutory means of prosecuting outsiders 
who actively tried to steal information, such as Edward Majerczyk,228 not a 
friend or coworker who viewed personal information on someone else’s 
tablet.229  Hence, it is inequitable to find that the average computer user has 
violated the CFAA when accessing information that is easily obtainable 
through the cloud when using a device.230  Unfortunately, the expansive 
amendments passed by Congress over the past thirty years and the varying 
interpretations of what it means to “exceed[] authorized access” under the 
CFAA that have emerged from the courts have led to this result.231 
 
 218. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text. 
 219. See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text. 
 220. See supra text accompanying note 90.  For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion 
advocating for the narrow view, see supra notes 166–70 and accompanying text. 
 221. See supra Parts II.A.2, II.A.4, II.B.2, II.B.4.  
 222. See supra Part II. 
 223. See supra Part II. 
 224. See supra Part II. 
 225. See supra Part II. 
 226. See supra Part I.B. 
 227. See supra Part I.B (explaining the purpose of the CFAA).   
 228. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text. 
 229. See supra Part I.B (discussing the purpose of the CFAA).  
 230. See supra Part I.A.  
 231. See supra Parts I.B, II.  
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As usage of the cloud becomes more widespread, it is important to clarify 
and amend the CFAA with respect to cloud computing.232  It is only a matter 
of time before a prosecutor somewhere decides to make an example out of a 
computer user who harmlessly accesses another person’s cloud account, like 
the individual in this Note’s hypothetical.233  Cloud-computing systems are 
unique in that anything on the cloud syncs to all devices connected to that 
cloud account and thus, the cloud deserves special treatment under the 
CFAA.234  Therefore, it is up to Congress to change the law. 
B.  A New CFAA Amendment:  One That Acknowledges the Cloud 
and Criminalizes Actions by Outsiders 
Since the statute’s enactment in the 1980s, multiple amendments have 
expanded the reach of the CFAA but none have specifically mentioned the 
cloud or determined how cloud computing fits into the framework of the 
law.235  In 2012, the Senate attempted to address cloud computing within the 
CFAA by proposing the Cloud Computing Act of 2012, but this bill was not 
ultimately adopted into law.236  Thus, under the current text of the Act, the 
cloud is not mentioned.237  The best solution to resolve the inequity that 
results from the treatment of cloud computing under the CFAA is for 
Congress to amend the statute to specifically address the cloud.  This is the 
only result that adequately protects innocuous insiders and advises courts, 
including the Supreme Court, on how to treat access to data on the cloud 
under federal law.238 
Congress should create a new provision of the CFAA modeled after 
§ 1030(a)(2)(C)239 that specifically addresses cloud computing and is 
grounded in the true purpose of the CFAA—criminalizing the actions of 
outsiders.240  The new provision should read:  “Whoever intentionally 
accesses data on the cloud without authorization and thereby obtains 
information from any protected computer shall be punished.”  In situations 
where the violation of the CFAA is suspected to involve the cloud, this new 
provision would apply, but it would not replace the current § 1030(a)(2)(C), 
which would still apply to situations in the employment context or other 
instances that may occur outside of the cloud.241 
 
 232. See supra note 11 (discussing how these types of cases are likely to become more 
common as people increasingly use the cloud). 
 233. For a discussion of the importance of this issue, see supra note 11. 
 234. See supra Part I.A.  
 235. See supra Part I.B.  
 236. For a discussion on the Cloud Computing Act of 2012, see supra note 66.  
 237. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).  
 238. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing how this issue involving the 
cloud is likely to become more prevalent in the future as usage of cloud computing expands).  
 239. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 240. See supra Part I.B.   
 241. The resolution of the circuit split and whether the current provisions of the CFAA 
should be amended is outside the scope of this Note. See supra note 225 and accompanying 
text.  
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In addition, Congress should include a definition of “without 
authorization” as part of the amendment, like the one that was proposed by 
Congress in a 2015 bill, to ensure that courts in all jurisdictions apply the 
CFAA consistently.242  The definition of “without authorization” must 
specify that the provision of the statute only applies to outsiders or hackers 
who:  (1) have no authority to access a computer or cloud account; (2) have 
no connection to the affected computer or cloud account; and (3) likely broke 
through some type of security to gain access to information on the computer 
or the cloud.243  Finally, this amendment should also include the standard 
definition of “cloud computing” commonly cited by scholars and established 
by the NIST to clarify what is meant by cloud computing and what is covered 
under this new provision.244 
The difference between this proposed amendment to the CFAA and the 
current provision in § 1030(a)(2)(C) is that, for cases where the cloud is a 
factor, an individual only violates the Act when she acts without any type of 
authorization and is considered an outsider rather than an insider.245  The part 
of the statute that involves “exceed[ing] authorized access” and applies to 
insiders is omitted because that phrase in the current statute could lead to the 
overcriminalization of computer users in situations involving the cloud.246  
This is an essential amendment because it would only classify outside 
hackers, who have no authorization to access cloud data in the first place, as 
violators of the CFAA, which was the original intent of the statute.247  As 
evidenced throughout this Note, no matter which interpretation of 
authorization a court applies, situations involving the cloud could be a 
violation of the CFAA under all of them, even when the action taken on a 
computer is outside the scope of the statute’s true purpose.248  This result can 
and should be remedied by congressional action. 
CONCLUSION 
The framework established to interpret authorization under the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act in the employment context can be applied—and, in fact, 
by its design does apply—to interpreting authorization outside the 
employment context in situations involving cloud-computing systems.  But 
while cloud-computing hacks by outsiders fall within the mischief the statute 
was designed to combat, the current interpretations of the Act render it too 
expansive and would result in the characterization of many innocuous 
insiders as computer hackers under federal law.  In essence, the CFAA is ill-
 
 242. For a discussion of the proposed 2015 amendment to the CFAA, see supra note 91.  
Under the text of the current statute, “without authorization” is not defined. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1030. 
 243. See supra notes 77, 79 and accompanying text.  
 244. See supra note 23 and accompanying text; see also Part I.A.  
 245. See supra notes 76–83 and accompanying text (discussing insiders versus outsiders 
under the CFAA).  
 246. See supra Parts I.B, II. 
 247. See supra Part I.B (explaining how the CFAA was intended to be an antihacking 
statute).  
 248. See supra Part II.  
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equipped to handle this evolving computer trend.  Congress can remedy this 
by enacting an amendment to the CFAA that specifically targets outsiders 
and guides courts on how to treat cloud-computing systems under the law to 
resolve this unfair and unreasonable situation. 
 
